It appears today, based on some news reports, that our NATO allies may not be so avid to pursue joint military action with the United States as we had hoped or believed a day ago when Secretary of State Powell commenced his global telephoning of NATO leaders.
Perhaps it was naive to suppose that the United States wouldn't have to pursue military operations alone. But in the world of realpolitik, it was, after all, us who were attacked in this instance and not the Europeans. Perhaps they believe that terrorists will let them alone in order to concentrate their malice on the Great Satan. History would seem to instruct us that Europe is enjoying a mere pause in the usual harassments they have suffered at the hands of Islamic terrorists, and when terrorist attacks resume in Europe, their mutual interest with the United States may be rekindled. For now, it may be futile to condition American military plans on the transient feelings of other nations.
Perhaps the Russians will still provide the US with forward base facilities to enter Afghanistan for the necessary but ugly job of putting Taliban out of business. The Russians, after all, have as much interest in neutralizing radical Islam on their borders as we have, separated by an ocean and half-a-hemisphere.
The Pakistanis appear to be waffling in their commitment to provide assistance for military action against the Taliban.
In any case, further reflection prompts me to advance these tactical considerations for our response to the attacks of Tuesday, Sept 11th.
Afghanistan is the poorest and most wretched state in central Asia. However, it occupies forbidding, landlocked terrain that has defeated some of the great powers of modern times, first the British empire at its height, and more recently the Soviet army. Unlike the British of the late 19th century, the U.S. has the ability to project air power into Afghanistan from thousands of miles away. Conventional wisdom states that air power alone cannot necessarily defeat even weak adversaries. That may be true even with wretched Afghanistan, but there is little meaningful infrastructure remaining in Kabul, and a modest application of air power might tip the country into the Bronze Age.
Unlike the Soviets of the 1980s, the U.S. military is not a demoralized institution. The terrain may be extremely challenging, but it is not jungle like Vietnam. It doesn't afford cover in the same way. That said, the prospects for controlling Afghan territory indefinitely would appear dubious. Yet the need to disable Taliban remains pressing.
It seems to me that there is an urgent need for the United States to gain control of the stockpiles of anthrax, smallpox, other biological and chemical agents, and nuclear experiments within the territory of Iraq. How this operation might be carried out, I cannot begin to try to describe, except to say that it would require both tremendous brute military force and delicacy of execution. But what is the alternative? To wonder what Saddam Hussein might choose to do with these materials?