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Jim,

Below is one of the many "news flash" items I get from the local union reps.

I thought this was worthy of your time and attention, due to the fact it so accurately sums up the REAL problem our nation faces with any immediate passenger train introduction.

In the most simplistic of explanations, we've not only scrapped route miles, but also the vital subcomponent of track density on what routes are still extant. In scrapping the density we've created a physical rail plant that by its very design makes no allowance for passenger trains to do what they are supposed to do; pick up and drop off passengers without bringing everything else to a stop!

Just this past twenty four hours I took a load of Honda automobiles down to Cincinnati. Upon arrival in Cincinnati, I parked my train at "Tower A", next to a tied-down (parked and crewless) coal train. The coal train was sitting on the only remaining track with platform, of what was once a 26 track with platform and concourse attached to the Cincinnati Union Terminal. In effect there was no freaking way for any passenger trains to pick up or disembark passengers, on the only fucking platform in all of Cincinnati! Not until that coal train had a crew and then possibly, maybe by chance, get clearance to move on and out of the way.

In reality, beyond what the 'news flash" talks about, I'm telling you the freight railroads have left only the bare minimum track density needed to accommodate the few intercity Amtrak trains still operating.

(signed)

"Anonymous"

FREIGHTS HOBBLE AMTRAK

(The following opinion article was published by the Transportation Research
Board's Intercity Rail Passenger System's Committee.)

Amtrak, our national intercity rail passenger network, may be America's
longest running act of despair.

The Bush administration, which calls Amtrak a relic of the past, is direct
and vocal in its desire to starve Amtrak of federal funding.

Major freight railroads, which host intercity Amtrak trains, are more
circumspect in their public comments, but equally anxious to vanquish those
pesky passenger trains, which interfere with more profitable freight traffic
on increasingly congested mainline track -- capacity reduction occasioned by
freight railroad mergers and line abandonments.

If Amtrak were seen as a more efficient operation, its critics would have
fewer opportunities to pull the feeding tube, and its supporters would find
greater acceptance for creating a consistent and reliable federal subsidy
for Amtrak.

The most visible and nagging of Amtrak's problems are intercity passenger
trains that do not and cannot run on time because of operational conflicts
on freight lines.

All but 730 miles of the 21,000-mile Amtrak system are owned, operated and
dispatched by freight railroads. Those freight railroads consider Amtrak's
payments for track rental and on-time bonuses as relatively minor sums that
are unlikely to influence operating priorities. In the words of a Union
Pacific official, "Waving money in front of us isn't going to fix the
problem, because the reality is, you have a lot of freight trains out
there."

This being the case, the Bush administration's proposal to fix Amtrak --
through a public-private partnership involving the states -- lacks merit. As
Amtrak's former president, David Gunn, observed, "What is the point in
providing additional funds for new state-supported rail services if those
trains are just going to suffer the same congestion and dispatching problems
that befall Amtrak's current trains?"

If opinion leaders and decision makers are serious about keeping intact a
national intercity rail passenger network (and Congress keeps reminding us
that any breakup of Amtrak will so erode political support for Amtrak that
federal funding for even the Northeast Corridor will dry up) then the
starting point should be improving the level of service over
freight-railroad owned track.

Practically, this means the enforcement of the initial Amtrak contract
signed by the freight railroads in 1970, which enabled them to avoid (at the
time) an almost $1 billion annual cost of operating passenger trains --
approximately $5.3 billion in 2007 dollars.

At that time, the freight railroads voluntarily and vigorously embraced
legislation in which they pledged to give Amtrak trains preference over
their freight consists. And you can look it up: U.S. Code 49, 24308(C).

In fact, Amtrak intercity trains utilizing freight railroad track most often
run late (only 61 percent of such Amtrak trains run on time, and many arrive
seven and eight hours late).

As long as there are no penalties for delaying Amtrak trains, the freight
railroads have every incentive not to give them preference.

Some may suggest that turning Amtrak over to the private sector would
largely solve the problem, but consider the observation of Gunn's successor
at Amtrak, former Union Pacific Vice President Alexander Kummant: "It is an
intersection of a subsidized structure with a truly private-sector
structure, so how do you coexist?"

Amtrak and freight railroads must coexist, because an aging U.S. population,
growing highway and commercial aviation congestion, and greater demand for
intercity mobility, require an effective and efficient alternative to
automobiles, buses and airplanes.

The one corridor where Amtrak does perform mostly on time is the one
corridor it owns: the Northeast Corridor from Washington, D.C., to Boston.
Between Washington and New York, for example, Amtrak's share of end-point
travelers has grown from 45 to 54 percent since 2000.

Amtrak is capable of operating its trains efficiently -- thus our suggestion
that the Amtrak debate shift to a focus of freight railroads giving Amtrak
trains the priority handling the law requires in order to build a firm
foundation for Amtrak political support and the consistent and reliable
federal funding that would follow.

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